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Corporate tax behavior has recently received considerable public interest, and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that firms are increasingly concerned about the reputational risk of tax planning. Using 
RepRisk data to capture firms’ reputational risk due to public scrutiny, this study examines the 
relationship between reputational risk and corporate tax planning. If managers anticipate higher 
costs of tax planning in response to higher reputational risk, firms might adjust their tax behavior. 
My results suggest that firms initially react to more public scrutiny and report higher GAAP 
effective tax rates. However, this association reverses once public scrutiny decays, suggesting that 
firms make rather superficial changes of their tax behavior in response to public pressure.  
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Using a large cross-country panel data set, this study investigates the relationship between 
reputational risk imposed by public scrutiny and corporate tax planning.2 In recent years, a surge 
of negative media coverage about corporate tax issues (Chen, Schuchard and Stomberg, 2019) and 
stakeholder activism has increasingly imposed reputational costs on firms whose tax behavior the 
public has viewed with a skeptical eye. Some go so far as to label these companies as poor 
corporate citizens (Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 2016). Although extensive literature shows that 
aggressive tax planning is a widely spread phenomenon, a significant share of firms seem to forgo 
maximizing their tax planning opportunities (“under-sheltering puzzle”; Hanlon and Heitzman, 
2010). For instance, while approximately one-tenth of U.S. firms in Thomsen and Watrin (2018) 
are able to maintain long-term effective tax rates (ETR) below 20%, other firms show ETRs that 
even exceed the statutory corporate income tax rate. Consistent with the global tax planning 
framework in Scholes et al. (2014), firms will choose their optimal level of tax planning by 
carefully outweighing the marginal benefits of taxes saved against the marginal costs.  
An important factor why firms may not fully exploit their tax minimization potential might 
be concerns about the reputational costs of tax planning. Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms 
are concerned about reputational cost in the context of their tax strategy. For instance, Forbes 
quotes a “Big 4” tax practitioner: “We’re seeing a huge shift in perception around issues of 
reputational and audit risk and that’s really starting to affect how companies approach tax 
planning” (Harpaz, 2013). At the firm level, Vodafone Group Plc directly links its tax strategy to 
reputational risk and states that “[…] the Group does not want its tax affairs to appear in public 
domain and will work to avoid any negative impact on shareholder value” (Vodafone, 2019).   
In the same vein, evidence in the literature indicates that reputation matters for firms’ tax 
strategies. According to a survey in Graham et al. (2014), corporate tax executives rank 
reputational concerns as the second most important reason to refrain from engaging in aggressive 
tax planning activities. Moreover, recent studies provide experimental evidence about adverse 
consumer reactions after they were exposed to news about tax aggressive firms. Asay et al. (2018) 
find that U.S. consumers significantly reduce their preference for purchasing products from a 
                                                 




company that is associated with aggressive tax practices. Similarly, Hardeck et al. (2019) present 
some evidence that corporate tax strategies influence consumers’ willingness to pay and their 
general attitude towards firms, but they also report significant differences between U.S. and 
German consumers.  
Yet, empirical evidence on the relationship between reputational costs and tax planning 
using archival data is rather limited, e.g. (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Gallemore, Maydew and 
Thornock, 2014; Chen, Schuchard and Stomberg, 2019) or focused on specific U.S. firms only 
(Austin and Wilson, 2017). Also, little is known about how managers actually perceive 
reputational risk related to tax planning and how they manage such risk in practice (Graham et al., 
2014; Bruehne and Schanz, 2019). 
The purpose of this study is to shed light on the question of whether reputational risk at the 
firm-level influences the cost-benefit equilibrium of tax planning. This is an interesting question 
because it is ex-ante unclear if concerns about firms’ own reputations are strong enough to alter 
their cost-benefit calculations of tax planning activities. On the one hand, firms may refrain from 
aggressive tax planning if they anticipate that the expected costs from engaging in aggressive tax 
strategies exceed any tax savings. On the other hand, the benefits of tax planning, e.g. lower cost 
of capital and overall higher shareholder value (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009), may outweigh 
possible negative consequences to firm reputation. Thus, despite anecdotal and survey evidence, 
there is no clear empirical picture of whether reputational concerns actually have an impact on tax 
planning.  
According to the framework developed in Wilde and Wilson (2018), firms face three 
different expected costs related to tax planning, which can be broken down into agency costs, 
implementation costs and outcome costs. Since reputational costs are subsumed under the latter, I 
will focus on how reputational concerns as an expected outcome cost influence corporate tax 
behavior. Firms may consider several forms of reputational costs with respect to their tax planning.  
First, managers may fear consumer backlash if the public negatively perceives their tax strategies. 
In 2012, Starbucks UK faced a public media outcry over its low corporation income tax payments 
in the past. As a response to this controversy, the firm announced to voluntarily increase its future 
tax payments. In a U.S. study, Austin and Wilson (2017) show that firms with valuable brands 
engage in lower levels of tax avoidance, suggesting that firm reputation with respect to consumers 
matters. Second, firms have increasingly become a target of public shaming campaigns of activists 
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such as NGOs in recent years. In 2010, ActionAid started campaigning against FTSE 100 firms 
that violated UK specific disclosure obligations about tax haven subsidiaries. Dyreng, Hoopes and 
Wilde (2016) document that this public pressure from an outside activist group led to higher tax 
payments of publicly accused firms. Third, policy backlash, i.e. due to changes in tax or regulatory 
rules, is often subsumed under reputational costs (Hoopes, Robinson and Slemrod, 2018). 
According to Zimmerman (1983), firms under greater scrutiny from the administrative authorities 
face higher political costs imposed by regulation, taxes or burdens to international trade. For 
instance, since the reputation of international banks eroded during the financial crisis, policy 
makers introduced new rules to regulate the financial industry with the aim of a “fair and 
substantial contribution by the financial sector” (IMF, 2010). In Europe alone, 15 governments 
implemented bank levies to compensate taxpayers for bailing out distressed banks imposing 
significant costs to affected banks (Kogler, 2019). 
To measure firms’ reputational risk, I use data from RepRisk, a commercial environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) data provider. Rather than measuring the absolute level of 
reputation, RepRisk data serves as an indicator of reputational risk related to Environmental, 
Social, and Governance (ESG) issues and business conduct of a company. RepRisk’s key metric 
to capture firm-specific reputational risk is the RepRisk Index (RRI). The measure is based on 
negative stakeholder sentiment and captures a wide range of sources (including news agencies and 
stakeholder communications) that can affect a company's reputation and covers all types of 
traditional media, such as print newspapers, as well as negative opinions expressed in social media 
and other publicly available sources. Since the data is available in panel form starting in 2007, it 
allows the comparison of a company’s exposure with that of its peers and helps to track 
reputational risk trends over time.  
I first analyze whether higher levels of reputational risk induced by negative stakeholder 
sentiment are associated with the level of firms’ tax planning. Given increasing media attention 
and third-party campaigns against tax aggressive firms (e.g. ActionAid, 2011) it is possible that 
firms with greater reputational risk (as indicated by higher RRI values) are associated with less tax 
aggressive tax planning due to their greater vulnerability to public shaming, consumer boycotts, 
as well as political and other expected outcome costs of tax planning. Since managers continuously 
monitor and actively engage in activities to protect their own firms’ reputation (Emler, 1990; 
Bromley, 1993), it is possible that higher reputational risk induced by more negative stakeholder 
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sentiment can spill over to corporate tax behavior as higher reputational risk may increase the 
outcome costs of tax planning. Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde (2016) suggest that public pressure 
from outside activist groups can exert a significant influence on the tax behavior of large, listed 
firms in the United Kingdom. However, it is also possible that firms react insensitively to more 
negative stakeholder sentiment if managers do not believe that the cost-benefit ratio of tax planning 
is affected by higher public scrutiny (Chen, Schuchard and Stomberg, 2019).  
To examine how public scrutiny is associated with corporate tax planning, I begin the 
empirical analysis with an OLS levels-specification with the 1-year GAAP ETR as the dependent 
variable. The results of the first empirical test reveal a statistically significant association between 
higher levels of reputational risk and corporate tax planning in several model specifications. In 
other words, firms that experience more public scrutiny are associated with higher effective tax 
rates.  
Second, I investigate whether changes in reputational risk are symmetrically associated 
with corporate tax planning. Similar to the first research question, it is possible that firms with 
lower reputational risk ramp up their tax aggressiveness since managers may anticipate lower 
outcome costs to tax planning if they face little or no public scrutiny. In a static world, companies 
would weigh the tax and non-tax costs of their tax behavior and always converge to the optimal 
level of tax planning (Kim et al., 2019).3 In other words, more (less) public scrutiny against the 
firm could be associated with higher (lower) ETRs. However, recent survey results from interviews 
with corporate tax insiders challenge this view. Bruehne and Schanz (2019) report that most tax 
managers view risk related to corporate tax practices as a one-sided construct only. Based on these 
survey insights, it is possible that lower reputational risk does not lead to more tax aggressiveness 
if managers consider reputational risk only in terms of its downside potential.  
Applying a staggered difference-in-difference analysis, the results of the second part of the 
empirical analysis reveal limited evidence that changes in reputational risk affects firms’ tax 
planning behavior. While an increase of reputational risk is associated with positive changes in 
ETRs, I find the opposite result for decreasing reputational risk. This symmetric reaction suggests 
that firms initially react towards more public scrutiny by upwardly adjusting their reported tax 
payments, however this effect reverses once reputational risk decays. Moreover, additional tests 
                                                 
3 Yet, in a dynamic world this may be very different as firms could face frictions such as transaction costs, 
information asymmetries or incomplete markets (Kim et al., 2019). 
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indicate that managers react timely to changes of negative stakeholder sentiment by quickly 
adjusting their GAAP ETRs as these tests over a multiyear period do not reveal a significant 
association in a time lead-lag specification.  
The last part of the empirical analysis applies several cross-sectional tests including the 
effect of tax haven vs non-haven countries, the passage of time, and political risk. These additional 
results suggest that the relationship between firm-specific reputational risk and tax planning only 
exists for firms incorporated in non-haven countries. Further, the association is only present for 
later years in the sample period suggesting that reputational concerns about firms’ own tax 
planning became more important over time, in line with increasing media coverage during the past 
years. Lastly, I do not find evidence that firms with higher political risk react differently to 
reputational risk from public scrutiny.  
This paper contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, my study answers a call 
for more research on the question of why some firms seem to refrain from exploiting all their tax 
planning opportunities (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). My study provides much needed evidence 
for the role of reputational concerns as one possible factor to explain the so called under-sheltering 
puzzle, i.e. the observation that some firms do not exhaust their tax planning opportunities 
(Weisbach, 2001) 
Second, I contribute to the literature stream on the reputational costs of tax planning that 
has emerged from the literature focusing on the under-sheltering puzzle. By looking at reputational 
risk, I focus on a specific form of firm risk, with the potential to increase reputational costs as a 
type of the expected outcome costs of corporate tax planning. Moreover, I answer a recent call for 
more research on this topic raised in Wilde and Wilson (2018). 
Third, this study ties in with a strand of literature indicating that firms, especially 
multinational corporations are under increased media scrutiny regarding their tax planning and that 
affected firms may change their tax behavior in response (e.g. Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 2016; 
Chen, Schuchard and Stomberg, 2019; Schmal, Schulte Sasse and Watrin, 2021). Nonetheless, the 
fact that my study presents only limited evidence of a substantial tax planning change is more 
consistent with previous studies finding that companies tend to make rather superficial changes in 
response to public scrutiny (Bednar, 2012; Kuhnen and Niessen, 2012; Chen, Schuchard and 
Stomberg, 2019). 
Lastly, this study is also relevant for policy makers. Recent years showed a surge of 
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international tax disclosure regulations in several industries4 and there is an ongoing discussion in 
the EU about further increasing tax transparency of large firms from all industries, i.e., public 
Country-by-Country Reporting (Council of the European Union, 2021). Proponents argue that 
increasing transparency enables stakeholders, including governments, consumers, media, and 
NGOs to mobilize public pressure against firms and change their business behavior in a socially 
desirable way (Dutt et al., 2019; Hombach and Sellhorn, 2019b). However, my study does not 
show a consistent picture that stakeholder scrutiny leads companies, on average, to change their 
tax planning behavior in a substantial manner, and therefore casts doubt on one expected 
mechanism (public shaming) of increasing tax transparency as a policy tool (Harpaz, 2017; 
Hoopes, Robinson and Slemrod, 2018). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the construct of 
reputational risk, reviews related key papers, and builds the hypotheses. Section 3 includes the 
data description and the empirical design. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 discusses 
additional tests in the cross-sections. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Reputational risk, prior literature, and hypotheses development 
 
Corporate reputation is a multifaceted construct associated with the stakeholders of the firm 
(Gallemore, Maydew and Thornock, 2014) and can be viewed as an intangible asset reflecting the 
“global perception of the extent to which an organization is held in high esteem or regard” (Weiss, 
Anderson and MacInnis, 1999). Organizations with a well-established reputation have higher 
consumer satisfaction (Helm, Garnefeld and Tolsdorf, 2009), show superior financial performance 
(Sánchez and Sotorrío, 2007) and are also able to sustain superior profits over time (Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002). Relatedly, much of the non-tax literature on corporate reputation is concerned 
with the actual costs resulting from reputation-damaging events. For instance, event studies on 
accusations or actual commitment of fraudulent firm activities such as bribery or fraudulent 
accounting restatements (Karpoff, Lee and Martin, 2008; Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs, 2009) or 
environmental violations (Karpoff, Lott and Wehrly, 2005) show severe reputational costs 
                                                 
4 For example, EU regulations for the extractive and lodging industry (Directive 2013/34/EU) and financial industry 




contributing to negative stock market reactions.  
Also, a strand of studies has emerged in the empirical tax literature that centers on the 
relationship of reputational costs and corporate tax planning; however, this research yields mixed 
evidence. While some archival studies identify specific research settings in which reputational 
costs influence firms’ tax planning decisions, other studies fail to do so, leading to a continued 
lack of broad empirical evidence.   
Relatedly, Chen, Schuchard, and Stomberg (2019)  report that U.S. firms with tax payments 
below the statutory rate have a higher likelihood of tax coverage in the media. However, their 
study also shows that firms do not become less tax aggressive after exposure to negative media 
coverage. This study differs from Chen, Schuchard and Stomberg (2019) in several ways. First, I 
apply a large cross-country panel data set, which enables the investigation of expected cross-
sectional differences with respect to reputational costs (Wilde and Wilson, 2018). Second, my 
construct of reputational risk is based on the RepRisk database, which covers not only mainstream 
media but also social media. This aspect carries particular weight as firms are increasingly subject 
to negative sentiment on social media platforms, most prominently via Twitter.5  Third, RepRisk 
is not limited to negative stakeholder sentiment arising from corporate tax issues but a measure of 
a negative sentiment stemming from a variety of corporate issues related to ESG-related risks.6 
This study is also related to Hanlon and Slemrod (2009). In their paper, the authors analyze 
stock market reactions to news about firms engaging in tax shelters. Their results show, on average, 
a negative association between share prices and tax avoidance that is amplified for firms in the 
retail sector, suggesting that reputation matters with respect to firms’ customer reputation. Instead 
of investigating the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value, I am interested whether 
firms that face increasing reputational risk change their tax planning behavior.  
In contrast, Gallemore, Maydew and Thornock (2014) fail to provide significant evidence 
whether firms that engage in tax sheltering suffer from reputational costs. Several tests seeking to 
determine whether aggressive tax strategies increase reputational costs either at the firm or 
executive level do not show results. In contrast to their research question, I am interested in how 
higher levels of reputational risk affect tax planning behavior, thereby reversing the direction of 
                                                 
5 For instance, Oxfam International, an influential NGO, which regularly campaigns against multinational firm 
behavior, has more than 800,000 followers on Twitter, which largely helps to multiply negative sentiment.  




the association between reputation and tax planning in my research design.  
I complement the findings of Dyreng, Hoopes, and Wilde (2016), and investigate the 
relationship between reputational risk and tax planning for a large cross-country sample over a 
long time period. Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde (2016) analyze a shock to public scrutiny to large, 
listed UK firms and finds that public pressure exerted by an NGO can lead to lower tax avoidance 
as measured by higher ETRs and a decrease of subsidiary presence in tax havens of scrutinized 
firms. They focus solely on large public firms in the UK that were publicly shamed because they 
failed to disclose their real exposure to tax havens as required by a UK-specific transparency 
regulation.  In contrast, my research design offers a possibility for further insights on the question 
of how reputational risk influences tax planning, exploiting cross-sectional variation such as 
structural breaks in the time series or firm-specific heterogeneity. Moreover, my analysis does not 
particularly rely on firms violating any transparency laws but instead includes all firms in the 
database independent of their compliance status. 
Firms with valuable brands engage in lower levels of tax avoidance, suggesting that firm 
reputation with respect to consumers matters (Austin and Wilson, 2017). I complement this study 
as I am also interested in the question of whether reputational costs are a deterrent of aggressive 
tax planning. By focusing on firms’ reputational risk I investigate additional channels (the risk of 
being publicly shamed or a policy backlash) that may explain why some firms refrain from 
aggressive tax strategies. In addition to Austin and Wilson (2017) who only focus on U.S. firms 
with valuable brand names, I use a large cross-country sample over time that may also capture 
variation in reputational risk due to different locales, cultural considerations, or industry status.    
In light of the importance of corporate reputation, it is unsurprising that organizations 
continuously monitor and actively engage in activities to protect their own reputation, as suggested 
by reputational theory (Emler, 1990; Bromley, 1993). Moreover, since organizations operate 
within a broader social system, legitimacy theory suggests that companies constantly try to ensure 
that they operate within the limits and norms of society (Deegan, 2002). This understanding allows 
for the presumption that managers anticipate increased risk to firms’ reputation, and they may 
engage in actions to mitigate those risks. For instance, Gow, Wahid and Yu (2018) indicate that 
firms voluntarily omit their directors’ employment history with troubled firms from proxy filing. 
Relatedly, Dyreng et al. (2020) and Gramlich and Whiteaker-Poe (2013) report that firms omit 
reporting tax haven subsidiaries from Exhibit 21 forms because of their susceptibility to 
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reputational risks. Thus, one line of defense against higher reputational risk may be linked to the 
tax strategy if managers fear that negative stakeholder sentiment can stem from tax issues. 
Given historically high levels of public attention and stakeholder scrutiny on corporate tax 
issues, companies not only fear negative reporting on their tax planning (Graham et al., 2014), but 
even actively seek to avoid negative attention to it (Dyreng et al., 2020). It is therefore possible 
that firms react sensitively to negative changes of reputational risk triggered by more negative 
stakeholder sentiment and adjust their tax planning, even if the source of increased reputational 
risk is unrelated to tax issues. In this line, Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2004) provide evidence 
that some firms even pay taxes on fraudulent earnings, presumably to avoid further scrutiny on 
their illegal activities from tax authorities. Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical mechanism inspired 
by Wilde and Wilson’s (2018) framework on the determinants of corporate tax planning. If 
managers believe that higher reputational risk increases the outcome costs of corporate tax 
planning, it is possible to expect a negative relationship between reputational risk and tax planning, 
i.e. firms will report higher effective tax rates in response to public scrutiny.  
 
“Figure 1 around here” 
 
However, it is not clear if an increase of reputational risk is strong enough to change the 
cost-benefit equilibrium of tax planning. From a traditional view, tax planning can reduce firms’ 
capital costs and hence increases firm value, ceteris paribus (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). To the 
extent that investors do not believe that reputational costs will outweigh the benefits of tax 
planning, firms might anticipate higher reputational risk without adjusting their tax behavior. It is 
also conceivable that companies will take alternative non-tax measures to respond to higher 
reputational risk, e.g. through advertising campaigns or other ways of influencing stakeholders of 
the firm (Eccles, Newquist and Schatz, 2007). Finally, a recent study suggests that consumers 
almost never consider corporate tax activities when making purchasing decisions, calling into 
question an important perceived channel of how reputational costs can manifest through consumer 
behavior (Asay et al., 2021). 
In a nutshell, given the mixed results of prior studies on the relationship of tax planning 
and reputational costs as well as ambiguous theoretical predictions, it is an empirical question 
whether there is an association between reputational risk and corporate tax planning. Thus, I state 
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the following hypothesis in the null form. 
 
H1: There is no association between reputational risk of a firm and its corporate tax 
planning. 
 
Hypothesis 1 raises a natural follow-up question on the association between higher 
(lower) levels of reputational risk because of more (less) or no public scrutiny, and corporate 
tax planning. Based on Figure 1, a symmetric result for higher and lower reputational risk 
changes could be expected. For instance, less public scrutiny could reduce the expected 
outcome costs of tax planning and give managers more discretion to engage in aggressive 
tax planning. In an alternative scenario, it is possible that firms, after they initially became 
less tax aggressive in response to an increase of reputational risk in the short-run, reverse 
their tax planning back to previous levels once they are “off the radar” of public scrutiny. 
However, recent survey findings challenge this view. Bruehne and Schanz (2019) show that 
most tax managers within firms view tax risk related to corporate tax planning as a downside 
risk only. Thus, an alternate expectation could be an asymmetric tax planning reaction where 
only negative changes in reputational risk are associated with changes in firms’ tax planning. 
In other words, managers may not be prone to engage in more aggressive tax planning 
activities after the firm’s reputational risk decreases through an absence or decay of negative 
stakeholder scrutiny. Taken together, it is an empirical question whether positive or negative 
changes in reputational risk have an association with tax planning, which leads to the 
following hypothesis   
 
H2: There is no association between positive (negative) changes in reputational risk 









3. Data and empirical strategy 
Reputational risk data 
As a proxy for reputational risk at the firm-level, I use the RepRisk database, which tracks firms 
across the globe based on their exposure to reputational risks over time. The data starts in 2007 
and offers metrics capturing firm exposure to public scrutiny with respect to ESG-related issues. 
The scope of the database is comprised of 28 ESG issues outlined in Appendix B. RepRisk data is 
based on negative stakeholder sentiment, measured through multifarious sources including news 
agencies and stakeholder communication. RepRisk constructs its risk measures with the particular 
aim of capturing companies’ reputational risk that exceeds the absolute level of reputation, 
meaning that the data does not measure the absolute level of firm reputation, but gives an 
estimation about the vulnerability of a firm to suffer from actual reputational costs. It is therefore 
not a measure of firms’ ESG performance but a measure to systemically identify and assess risk 
stemming from stakeholder scrutiny (RepRisk, 2020). In the past, this database’s primary users 
were mainly institutional users such as financial service providers or other companies that analyzed 
the reputational risk of their customers or suppliers, but the data has recently found its way into 
the accounting, finance, and management literature (Kölbel, Busch and Jancso, 2017; Hombach 
and Sellhorn, 2019a; Glossner, 2021). 
The key firm-specific measure of RepRisk is the RepRisk Index (RRI), which is based on 
an algorithm that automatically tracks the firm’s exposure to reputational risks.7 This measurement 
is based on a daily search of multifarious sources covering traditional media, online media, social 
media (including Twitter and blogs), NGO and governmental reports, and other sources in 20 
different languages.8 In addition to the automated search approach, the RRI methodology includes 
human verification by in-house analysts (Busse and Margraf, 2017). The RRI is based on the reach 
                                                 
7 RepRisk offers several metrics as an alternative to the RRI. For instance, the RepRisk Rating (RRR) rates firms 
according to the overall ESG risk exposure including country and sector risk, i.e. the key difference between the 
RRI and RRR is that the RRR also considers a company's home country and industry risk exposure whereas the RRI 
considers only the ESG incidents in which the company was involved (i.e. its own actions). In several personal 
discussions, RepRisk officials have emphasized that the RRR is particularly useful when the sample consists mainly 
of private firms without own ESG incidents. Since the sample of this study only contains public firms, the RRI as a 
measure for firm-specific reputational risk is used as the proxy in the empirical analysis.   
8 Captured languages are: English, Arabic, Chinese, Danish, Dutch, Filipino, Finnish, French, German, Hindi, 
Italian, Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia), Japanese, Korean, Malaysian (Bahasa Malaysia), Norwegian, Portuguese, 
Russian, Spanish, and Swedish (RepRisk, 2020). 
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of the information source9, the frequency of the ESG risk incidents, as well as the risk incidents 
content, such as assessing severity (harshness) and novelty (newness) (RepRisk, 2020). The RRI 
is measured on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 representing no known risk and 100 representing an 
extremely high risk. Importantly, RepRisk does not verify any allegations against firms, meaning 
it does not apply systemic filtering since the focus of the RRI lies on the identification and 
assessment of firms’ idiosyncratic risk incidents. Hence, the RRI represents the current level of 
negative stakeholder attention and allows for a comparison of a company’s exposure with that of 
its peers over an unbroken time-series. 
Figure 2 plots the distribution of firm-years with a RepRisk Index greater than zero in the 
sample.  
 
“Figure 2 around here” 
 
The majority of observations in the sample (66%) have a RRI of 0, meaning no reputational risk 
exposure, which is in line with the expectation that most firms are not subject to public scrutiny 
with respect to ESG issues. Figure 1 shows that most observations exposed to reputational risk 
have, on average, a rather low exposure and only relatively few observations are subject to medium 
or high levels of public scrutiny10, but there is a lot of variation in the data set overall.  
Starbucks’ negative publicity in the UK provides an example of the RRI capturing how 
firm-specific incidents that may significantly increase reputational risk. In 2012, Starbucks faced 
a public outcry after Reuters published a report accusing  the firm of paying  little income tax over 
many years despite of generating several billion GBP in sales in the UK (Bergin, 2012). Following 
Hoopes, Robinson and Slemrod (2018), there are three key dates to Starbucks’ episode in the UK, 
all shown in Figure 3. This chart illustrates Starbucks RRI for 2012 and 2013 and shows a relatively 
constant risk exposure in the months before the public furor against Starbucks’ tax practices began. 
After the publication of Reuters’ special report in October, the RRI immediately reacted, reaching 
its peak at the end of 2012 (RRI=55) after the firm announced to voluntarily pay £20 million tax 
in the UK despite denying any misconduct. After the payment, the RRI sank back to normal levels, 
                                                 
9 For instance, a negative report in the Financial Times about a firm’s ESG incident has a higher weight compared to 
negative sentiment from a Twitter account with only a few followers.  
10 RepRisk defines the following RRI ranges for firms’ risk exposure: low risk exposure: 0-25; medium risk 
exposure: 26-49; high to very high risk exposure: 50-74, extremely high risk exposure: 75-100 (RepRisk, 2020).    
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reflecting a period without significant negative public sentiment related to novel incidents.11 
 
“Figure 3 around here” 
Firm data 
I collect financial data of firms from consolidated accounts in Compustat Global and Compustat 
North America to obtain a global sample for the years 2007-2019. Since I merge all Compustat 
databases based on ISIN (CUSIP) with RepRisk, the final sample includes only listed firms. Table 
1 outlines the sample selection procedure. Since financial data in Compustat Global is shown in 
local reporting currencies, I convert all local values into USD based on the average exchange rate 
for each firm’s fiscal year using global currency data from World Bank. Following a standard 
procedure, I censor the ETR between 0 and 1, drop duplicates in the data and finally delete all 
values with missing data for the calculation of the control variables. The final sample consists of 
61,555 firm-year observations corresponding to 8,154 individual firms. 
 
“Table 1 around here” 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the location of firms’ headquarter countries. While the 
USA leads this list, some Asian and European countries are also represented in the top 10. In total, 
the sample includes firm-year observations from 99 jurisdictions across the globe. The summary 
statistics are shown in Table 3. One obvious limitation of the data approach is that the final sample 
only includes publicly listed firms and hence my results may not be generalizable to private firms. 
However, the descriptive statistics of the sample do not show clear outliers compared to other 
cross-country samples based on Compustat Global and Compustat North America (e.g. Thomsen 
and Watrin, 2018). 
The main variable of interest, 1-year GAAP-ETR, is around 27% on average. The average 
RepRisk Index is 6.99 with a range from 0 to 100, where 0 stands for no known and 100 for 
extreme levels of negative public sentiment against the firm. Consistent with the distribution 
pattern of Figure 2, about two-thirds of the observations face no reputational risk as measured by 
                                                 
11 RepRisk evaluates reports on risk incidents based on a rules-based methodology. Each incident is analyzed 
according to three parameters, i.e. severity, reach and novelty of the risk incident.  
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the RRI of 0, explaining the low average RRI of the overall sample. Moreover, I follow prior 
literature to determine control variables that may be correlated with corporate tax planning (e.g 
Rego, 2003; Chen et al., 2010; Austin and Wilson, 2017). The average firm size measured by the 
logarithm of total assets equals USD 599 million. Size is included as a control variable because 
larger firms are expected to have more tax planning opportunities. Similarly, more profitable firms, 
as proxied by the return on assets, are expected to be more tax aggressive. Since more levered 
firms are expected to benefit more from the tax shield, the model also controls for firms’ leverage. 
Additional control variables are Intangibles, Inventory Intensity, R&D Intensity, Capital Intensity, 
and Capex in order to account for differences in book and tax accounting, which could influence 
the GAAP-ETR. Finally, I also control for a firm’s statutory corporate income tax rate in its 
country of incorporation. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
“Table 2 & 3 around here” 
 
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix. The independent variable of interest, RRI, is 
positively correlated with the ETR, suggesting that higher levels of reputational risk are negatively 
associated with tax planning. Furthermore, Table 4 reveals a positive correlation between the RRI 
and firm size, reflecting the fact that larger firms are expected to have, on average, higher levels 
of reputational risk given their often global footprint and salience in the media (RepRisk, 2020). 
 
“Table 4 around here” 
 
Empirical design 
I start the multivariate analysis using an OLS levels-specification in order to establish a general 
association between tax planning and reputational risk. Therefore, I regress a firm’s ETR in year t 
on its RepRisk Index in the same year including control variables and industry and year fixed 
effects.    
 




I choose the 1-year GAAP ETR as a dependent variable to proxy for corporate tax planning 
for several reasons. First, the ETR is an established proxy in the literature to empirically reflect 
the construct of tax planning. Second, the GAAP ETR is one of the most visible and easiest to 
access tax metrics and has been often used to assess the tax behavior of firms by the media, NGOs 
and politicians. As firms are expected to monitor the development of their own reputational risk, 
it is likely that managers are most concerned about the GAAP ETR if they fear that public scrutiny 
spills over to corporate tax issues (Wilde and Wilson, 2018). This view is also consistent with 
survey results indicating that managers of listed companies generally prioritize the GAAP ETR 
over other metrics, such as cash taxes paid, with respect to a company's tax and accounting 
objectives (Graham et al., 2014). RRI represents the level of firm i’s RepRisk Index at the end the 
of fiscal year t. For an easier interpretation of the regression results, the RRI is normalized between 
0 and 1 (=RRI/100) so that it corresponds to the notation of the dependent variable. Furthermore, 
I control for several firm specific characteristics which were identified to influence tax planning 
in prior literature. I further add industry and time fixed effects to control for unobserved industry 
characteristics that do not change over time and year specific factors. 𝜀 represents the usual error-
term. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. Finally, all control variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the effect of outliers on the analyses. 
Next, the drivers of the association between public scrutiny and tax planning are 
investigated. The RepRisk database also offers granular information on the composition of the 
RepRisk Index, such as which ESG issues underlie the negative public sentiment. For example, 
Starbuck’s RepRisk Index at the end of 2012 was 55 and this figure was 0% based on 
environmental issues, 35% based on social issues and 65% based on governance issues. In other 
words, most of the public scrutiny at the end of 2012 was linked to governance issues of the firm, 
consistent with the view that Starbuck’s tax controversy drove the risk exposure because risk 
incidents involving tax avoidance fall under the database’s governance category. Thus, to test the 
association in Equation (I) for each type of ESG risk separately, the model is adopted in the 
following way (Equation II):  
 
(II)  𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝐸 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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Risk Percentage is the underlying share of Environmental or Social or Governance issues 
constituting the RepRisk Index in each firm-year, i.e. in total they add up to 100%.12 Therefore, 
𝛽1  estimates the association of the ETR and RepRisk Index, conditional on the share of the 
respective ESG issue separately. 
 
I continue to further corroborate the findings from Equation I and II and differentiate the 
association of corporate tax planning between increasing reputational risk (more stakeholder 
scrutiny) and decreasing reputational risk (less stakeholder scrutiny). To do so, I apply a 
generalized staggered difference-in-difference (DiD) design largely following Heider and 
Ljungqvist (2015). This model estimates how positive and negative changes of the RepRisk Index 
(RRI) separately affect firms’ tax planning behavior. In other words, the third model regresses the 
differences of firms’ ETR from period t to t+1 (first difference) on firms that were subject to an 
increase (decrease) of reputational risk compared to firms whose risk exposure remained constant 
during the same period (second difference). The treatment group therefore consists of firms that 
are exposed to a change in their levels of reputational risk over time. In contrast, the counterfactual 
of control firms is represented by firms that experience no change in reputational risk. 
 
Equation III outlines the model.  
 
(III) ∆𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝐼_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝐼_𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝐸 +
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
RRI_increase is equal to the difference of increasing values of the RRI from year t to t+1 
and 0 otherwise. RRI_decrease is equal to the difference of decreasing values of the RRI from year 
t to t+1 and 0 otherwise. All other variables are the same as shown in Equation I, however 
expressed in the form of differences. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level to account for 
serial correlation in the data (Petersen, 2009). The first difference removes unobserved firm-
specific fixed effects and, unlike a level specification with firm fixed effects, can easily account 
                                                 
12 For instance, Environmental Percentage represents the percentage of environmental (E) risk incidents in 
proportion to the total risk incidents that make up the Current RRI (RepRisk, 2020). 
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for repeated treatments (Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015). For instance, the model accommodates for 
firms experiencing a sequence of increasing reputational risk over time (i.e. its RRI increases 
several times) as well as treatment reversal (i.e. an increase of reputational risk followed by a 
decrease over time).  
 
4. Regression results and discussion  
 
I start the multivariate analysis with an OLS regression based on the model outlined in Equation I 
and regress firm i’s ETR in year t on the level of its RepRisk Index in the same period based on 
the pooled sample. According to H1, I expect no significant association between higher levels of 
the RepRisk Index (higher reputational risk) and ETRs.  
The results in Table 5 provide first evidence against H1 since all coefficients of RepRisk 
are positive and statistically significant, whether the model includes control variables or fixed 
effects or both (column 1-3). Table 5 presents first evidence of a statistically significant positive 
association between the RRI and ETR and suggests that firms seem to react to changes of 
reputational risk and adjust their tax planning behavior. However, since this model estimates a 
linear relationship between changes in reputational risk and corporate tax planning, it is not 
informative on how the direction of a change in RepRisk Index is associated with a change of the 
ETR.  
 
“Table 5 around here” 
 
Next, I investigate the underlying drivers of the above result exploiting the richness of the 
RepRisk data. As outlined in the previous sections, the RRI is based on negative stakeholder 
sentiment linked to three distinct ESG risk categories. According to Equation II, table 6 presents 
results for the separate estimation of the association of tax planning and reputational risk, 
conditional on the share of the respective ESG risk issue. While the interaction of RRI and the 
environmental share shows no significance, the coefficients for the interaction of RRI and social 
as well as governance shares load and have a positive sign. Column 3 indicates that companies 
react most strongly to reputational risk resulting from risk incidences related to corporate 
governance. This evidence is generally consistent with the fact that RepRisk subsumes risk 
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incidences related to firms’ tax behavior under the governance category.  
 
“Table 6 around here” 
 
In order to better understand how the direction of a change in the RepRisk Index is 
associated with tax planning, I largely follow Heider and Ljungqvist (2015). Their model allows 
differentiation of the association between increasing (decreasing) changes of reputational risk and 
corporate tax planning using a staggered difference-in-difference design. As outlined in Equation 
III, the coefficients of the variables RRI_increase (RRI_decrease) measure the impact of positive 
(negative) RRI changes on the difference in ETR of firm i from year t to year t+1, relative to firms 
whose risk exposure remained constant.   
The results in Table 7 are consistent with the previous estimations presented in table 5 and 
6 and show a statistically significant association between higher levels of reputational risk and 
ETR, as the coefficient of RRI_increase is positive and significant. However, the coefficient of 
RRI_decrease is positive and loads as well, suggesting that declining values of RRI are associated 
with lower ETR, or that firms report lower tax payments once the public pressure dwindles.13 I 
interpret this symmetric result for increasing (decreasing) RRI values as limited evidence that firms 
react to changes of their reputational risk environment. While managers adjust their ETRs 
positively in light of more public scrutiny, this behavior seems to reverse once the scrutiny fades 
and the RRI decays. 
 
“Table 7 around here” 
 
Next, I further investigate the timing of the treatment effects. Table 7, column 4 tests the 
association between more (less) reputational risk and tax planning in a five-year window with each 
two years leading and lagging the treatment year. Similarly to Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), 
Figure 4 illustrates this result graphically and tests whether and when corporate tax planning reacts 
to a change in reputational risk. It plots the average annual within-firm change in ETRs from year 
𝑡−2 to 𝑡+2 for treated firms that experience a change in their reputational risk exposure in year 𝑡0, 
relative to control firms with unchanged levels of reputational risk. Figure 4a indicates that firms 
                                                 
13 Note that to interpret the association of decreasing RRI values and ETR one needs to multiply 𝛽2 by -1. 
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with higher reputational risk levels in year 𝑡0 significantly increase their ETRs, relative to a group 
of firms with constant reputational risk levels. Furthermore, it suggests that in the two years before 
there was no significant difference in ETRs between treated and control firms, providing evidence 
for a parallel pre-trend, and that treated firms do not reverse this behavior in the subsequent years 
𝑡+1and 𝑡+2. Figure 4b plots consistent results for treated firms that experience lower reputational 
risk in year 𝑡0 as these firms significantly decrease their ETRs quickly. Similar to Figure 4a, there 
is no significant change in ETRs in the years prior and after the decrease in reputational risk 
exposure.  
 
“Figure 4 around here” 
 
Collectively, this evidence suggests that firms react quickly to a change in reputational risk 
induced by more (less) public scrutiny. Firms seem to be able to adopt to a changing reputational 
risk environment and alter their tax planning behavior accordingly. This is in line with prior 
findings suggesting that firms are flexible to adjust their tax behavior over the fiscal year in 
response to stakeholder demands (Dhaliwal, Gleason and Mills, 2004) or changing intra-group 
profitability (Hopland et al., 2018).  
 However, the results only show limited evidence that reputational concerns have a 
significant impact on overall tax planning, as the results do not indicate a permanent change in 
ETR in response to more public scrutiny. Instead, the DiD results suggest that higher reputational 
risk is associated with less aggressive tax planning, but this seems to reverse once the company's 
reputational risk declines again.   
 
5. Cross-sectional tests 
 
The last part of the empirical analysis includes three cross-sectional tests investigating 
heterogeneity across firms and a possible structural break in the time-series. First, I estimate 
Equation III separately for firms that are incorporated in tax havens and non-havens. Tax haven 
incorporation can be viewed as the most aggressive form of tax haven usage, offering tax planning 
opportunities that are not available to other multinational firms who only use tax haven subsidiaries 
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(Atwood and Lewellen, 2019).14 Yet, such choice of firm location may result in severe reputational 
penalties, as suggested by anecdotal evidence. After facing a petition signed by 300.000 
consumers, Walgreens withdrew its plan to relocate the firm from the U.S. to Switzerland due to 
concerns about “potential consumer backlash and political ramifications” (Lee, 2020). Thus, if 
firms still choose to incorporate in a tax haven, they should face lower outcome costs of tax 
planning (Wilde and Wilson, 2018), and consequently their tax planning behavior is expected to 
react less sensitively to a change in reputational risk. The results in table 8, columns 1 and 2 support 
this expectation as the coefficients for tax haven firms are insignificant.  
 
“Table 8 around here” 
 
Next, I test whether there is a structural break in the time series supporting the observation 
that concerns about reputational risk increasingly influence firms’ tax planning over time (Harpaz, 
2013). Thus, I split the sample around the year 2013 as it represents the median year of the sample 
period. Moreover, several events occurred around this year that potentially increased the sensitivity 
of companies to reputational risks related to their tax behavior, such as the public outcry against 
Starbucks in late 2012 or the publication of the BEPS report in early 2013 (OECD, 2013). The 
results in table 8, columns 3 and 4 suggest that the association between tax planning and 
reputational risk exists only for years after 2012, as the coefficients for earlier years do not load.  
Lastly, I test whether there are heterogeneous firm reactions to a changing reputational risk 
environment depending on the exposure to political risk. According to the political cost hypothesis, 
firms proactively take measures, such as reporting higher tax payments, to avoid adverse 
governmental interference. Firms headquartered in countries with high political risk may adjust 
their ETRs more strongly in response to public scrutiny because they could face higher political 
costs in the form of expropriation or stronger regulation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). To proxy 
for political risk, I use data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Based on a median 
split of headquarter countries with high (low) political risk, I separately run DiD estimations for 
firms that have their headquarters in a high (low) political risk country. However, columns 5 and 
6 do not present evidence that concerns about political costs drive the overall association between 
tax planning and reputational risk as the result for high (low) risk firms is comparable.  
                                                 
14 For instance, firms that are incorporated in a tax haven can circumvent CFC rules.  
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6. Conclusion and limitations 
 
This study investigates the empirical association between reputational risk and corporate tax 
planning. To proxy for reputational risk, I use data from RepRisk, a commercial environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) data provider that captures firms’ exposure to reputational risk 
stemming from public scrutiny. In light of historically high levels of public attention and 
stakeholder scrutiny regarding corporate tax issues (Graham et al., 2014; Chen, Schuchard and 
Stomberg, 2019), I provide limited evidence that firms react to changes of the reputational risk 
environment by adjusting their tax planning. While higher levels of reputational risk are positively 
associated with GAAP effective tax rates, the same test for decreasing levels of reputational risk 
shows declining ETRs. This symmetric result suggests that firms initially react in response to more 
public scrutiny with higher reported tax payments, but this association reverses once the attention 
fades over time. In line with prior findings on final quarter earnings management (Dhaliwal, 
Gleason and Mills, 2004) or intra-group profit shifting flexibility (Hopland et al., 2018), firms 
seem to be able to quickly adjust their tax behavior over the fiscal year as a lead-lag specification 
of the estimation shows no results. Additional tests in the cross-sections indicates that the 
relationship between public scrutiny and tax planning only exists for firms incorporated outside 
tax havens and only for later years in the sample. Moreover, the analysis provides no evidence that 
concerns about political cost drive the results.  
This analysis is subject to several limitations. First, the data used in this study contains 
only listed firms and hence my results may be not generalizable. For instance, smaller, non-listed 
companies may react differently to a change in reputational risk. Second, my study does not 
isolate the specific mechanisms for how reputational risk actually impacts corporate tax planning 
strategies.  
The study responds to a call for more research focusing on why some firms seem to refrain 
from exploiting all their tax planning opportunities (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). My study 
provides further evidence for the role of reputational concerns as one factor to explain the so 
called under-sheltering puzzle. In this line, I also respond to a call from Wilde and Wilson (2018) 
for more research on the reputational costs of tax planning. This study also contributes to a stream 
of literature indicating that firms are increasingly in the public spotlight regarding their tax 
behavior (Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 2016; Chen, Schuchard and Stomberg, 2019; Schmal, 
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Schulte Sasse and Watrin, 2021). 
Finally, given a recent surge of targeted transparency regulations aimed at nudging firm 
behavior in a socially desirable manner, my results are indirectly policy-relevant, as they do not 
provide evidence that firms, on average, substantially change their tax behavior in response to 
public scrutiny. In light of current discussions about the introduction of public Country-by-
Country Reporting (Council of the European Union, 2021), public shaming as an indirect 
mechanism of increasing tax transparency may not be an overall effective policy tool to change 
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Theoretical framework on the association between higher reputational risk and corporate tax 










































RepRisk Index for Starbucks and its tax controversy in the UK 
 
 
Figure 3 plots Starbuck’s RepRisk Index (RRI) from January 2012 until June 2013. Higher values indicate more 
negative public sentiment against the firms. Following Hoopes, Robinson and Slemrod (2018), there are three key 
dates related to Starbucks’ tax episode in the UK. October 15, 2012: Reuter’s published a report titled, “Special Report: 
How Starbucks avoids UK taxes” (Bergin, 2012); November 12, 2012: Starbucks officials appeared before the Public 
Accounts Committee (BBC, 2012); December 6, 2012: Starbucks announced to voluntary pay additional £20 million 






















Figure 4 plots annual coefficient estimates (annual difference-in-differences estimates) for an increase (a) and a 
decrease (b) of reputational risk in a five-year window. Dots represent point estimates and whisker bars represent 
90 percent confidence intervals. For the interpretation of (b), the coefficients must be multiplied by -1 as the RRI, 





Data Restrictions Observations 
Compustat Global firms from fiscal years 2007-2019 460 297 
Less observations based on unconsolidated accounts and missing ISIN -100 708 
Compustat North America firms from fiscal years 2007-2019 162 351 
Less observations based on unconsolidated accounts and missing CUSIP -15 401 
Total Compustat Sample 506 539 
Less observations after merger with RepRisk based on ISIN (CUSIP) -390 610 
Less duplicates -4 561 
Less observations due to censoring the ETR between 0 and 1 -25 659 
Less observations with missing reporting currency values -15 
Less observations after merger with currency data from World Bank -5 135 
Less observations due to missing control variables -19 408  
Final sample 61 155 
 
 





Top 10 headquarter countries 
Top 10 Headquarter Countries Observations % 
USA 13 090 19.10 
China 12 305 17.96 
Japan 6 483 9.46 
India 5 094 7.43 
Korea 3 337 4.88 
United Kingdom 2 765 4.04 
Hong Kong 1 932 2.82 
Australia 1 690 2.47 
France 1 475 2.15 
Germany 1 282 1.87 
 
 








Variables Observations Mean Sd Min Max P25 P50 P75 
1y GAAP-ETR 61,151 0.27 0.17 0 1 0.16 0.26 0.34 
RepRisk Index 61,151 6.99 11.14 0 75 0 0 15 
Size 61,151 7.35 1.86 2.76 12.22 6.06 7.31 8.58 
Leverage 61,151 0.17 0.19 0 0.98 0.01 0.12 0.26 
Intangibles 61,151 0.14 0.20 0 0.97 0.01 0.04 0.19 
R&D 61,151 0.01 0.02 0 0.13 0 0 0.01 
Inventory Intensity 61,151 0.13 0.14 0 0.73 0.02 0.09 0.19 
Capital Intensity 61,151 0.35 0.27 0.00 1.24 0.14 0.30 0.51 
Capex 61,151 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.44 0.02 0.04 0.08 
Roa 61,151 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.59 0.04 0.07 0.13 
Statutory Rate 61,151 0.30 0.08 0 0.41 0.25 0.30 0.36 
 







Table 4 displays Pearson correlations between the variables used in the empirical analysis. All variables are defined 














RepRisk Index 0.043* 1
Size 0.070* 0.472* 1
Leverage 0.009* 0.107* 0.289* 1
Intangibles 0.024* 0.079* 0.188* 0.336* 1
R&D -0.019* 0.066* 0.058* -0.078* 0.147* 1
Inventory Intensity 0.004 -0.076* -0.193* -0.087* -0.124* 0.040* 1
Capital Intensity -0.038* -0.005 -0.010* 0.308* -0.229* -0.176* -0.077* 1
Capex -0.047* -0.033* -0.098* 0.226* -0.070* -0.043* 0.057* 0.629* 1
Roa -0.101* -0.038* -0.188* -0.059* 0.080* 0.112* 0.137* 0.062* 0.271* 1
Statutory Rate 0.195* 0.030* 0.138* 0.138* 0.096* 0.069* -0.050* -0.071* -0.059* 0.002 1






The association between reputational risk and ETR 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ETR ETR ETR 
        
RepRisk Index 0.0373*** 0.0458*** 0.0801*** 
  (0.00926) (0.00933) (0.00877) 
Size 0.000866 0.000229   
  (0.000756) (0.000738)   
Leverage -0.0196*** -0.0243***   
  (0.00759) (0.00751)   
Intangibles 0.00987 0.0152**   
  (0.00641) (0.00622)   
R&D -0.228*** -0.332***   
  (0.0461) (0.0435)   
Inventory Intensity 0.0213** 0.0308***   
  (0.00861) (0.00804)   
Capital Intensity -0.0173*** -0.00794   
  (0.00654) (0.00616)   
Capex -0.00591 0.00426   
  (0.0182) (0.0181)   
Roa -0.193*** -0.184***   
  (0.0116) (0.0114)   
Statutory Rate 0.517*** 0.510***   
  (0.0161) (0.0155)   
Constant 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.259*** 
  (0.00748) (0.00736) (0.00139) 
        
Observations 61,151 61,217 77,583 
R-squared 0.081 0.072 0.010 
Industry & year fixed-effects yes no yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
Table 5 shows results of estimating the average association of RepRisk Index and the effective tax rate for the pooled 
sample (columns 1-3). The dependent variable is the 1-year GAAP-ETR of firm i. For an easier interpretation, 


















The association between reputational risk and ETR 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ETR ETR ETR 
        
RepRiskIndex*environmental share -0.00818     
  (0.0240)     
RepRiskIndex*social share   0.0271*   
    (0.0154)   
RepRiskIndex*governance share     0.0785*** 
      (0.0150) 
Size 0.00204*** 0.00167** 0.00108 
  (0.000713) (0.000725) (0.000724) 
Leverage -0.0200*** -0.0199*** -0.0195** 
  (0.00760) (0.00760) (0.00760) 
Intangibles 0.00932 0.00949 0.00980 
  (0.00641) (0.00641) (0.00640) 
R&D -0.224*** -0.223*** -0.234*** 
  (0.0461) (0.0461) (0.0462) 
Inventory Intensity 0.0210** 0.0211** 0.0214** 
  (0.00861) (0.00861) (0.00861) 
Capital Intensity -0.0177*** -0.0176*** -0.0162** 
  (0.00654) (0.00654) (0.00654) 
Capex -0.00485 -0.00507 -0.00765 
  (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0182) 
Roa -0.191*** -0.192*** -0.192*** 
  (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0115) 
Statutory Rate 0.518*** 0.517*** 0.520*** 
  (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0161) 
Constant 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 
  (0.00736) (0.00743) (0.00737) 
        
Observations 61,151 61,151 61,151 
R-squared 0.080 0.080 0.081 
Industry & year fixed-effects yes yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
Table 6 shows results of estimating the average association of RepRisk Index and the effective tax rate for the pooled 
sample (columns 1-3). The dependent variable is the 1-year GAAP-ETR of firm i. Environmental share is the 
underlying share of Environmental issues constituting the RepRisk Index in each firm-year. Social share is the 
underlying share of Social issues constituting the RepRisk Index in each firm-year. Governance share is the 
underlying share of Governance issues constituting the RepRisk Index in each firm-year. For an easier interpretation, 








The association between reputational risk and ETR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ETR ETR ETR ETR 
          
RepRiskIndex_increase 0.0204* 0.0188* 0.0187* 0.0318* 
  (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0100) (0.0163) 
RepRiskIndex_decrease 0.0438*** 0.0457*** 0.0381*** 0.0453* 
  (0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0237) 
F.RepRiskIndex_decrease       0.0165 
        (0.0223) 
F2. RepRiskIndex_decrease       -0.0200 
        (0.0216) 
F.RepRiskIndex_increase       -0.00906 
        (0.0162) 
F2.RepRiskIndex_increase       0.0169 
        (0.0104) 
L.RepRiskIndex_decrease       -0.000979 
        (0.0239) 
L2.RepRiskIndex_decrease       -0.0162 
        (0.0179) 
L.RepRiskIndex_increase       0.00647 
        (0.0165) 
L2.RepRiskIndex_increase       0.00834 
        (0.0186) 
ΔSize -0.0122*** -0.0124***   -0.00327 
  (0.00387) (0.00375)   (0.00417) 
ΔLeverage 0.00949 0.00953   0.00166 
  (0.00910) (0.00908)   (0.00949) 
ΔIntangibles 0.0164* 0.0175*   0.0144 
  (0.00984) (0.00983)   (0.0108) 
ΔR&D 0.0827 0.0978   0.153 
  (0.0910) (0.0904)   (0.109) 
ΔInventory Intensity 0.0923*** 0.0910***   0.0786*** 
  (0.0155) (0.0155)   (0.0172) 
ΔCapital Intensity 0.0313*** 0.0317***   0.0315*** 
  (0.00964) (0.00959)   (0.00989) 
ΔCapex 0.0358** 0.0358**   0.0425** 
  (0.0178) (0.0177)   (0.0184) 
ΔRoa -0.313*** -0.317***   -0.287*** 
  (0.0171) (0.0170)   (0.0186) 
ΔStatutory Rate 0.476*** 0.468***   0.190*** 
  (0.0578) (0.0583)   (0.0719) 
Constant 0.00456*** 0.00461*** 0.00158*** -0.00146* 
  (0.000825) (0.000813) (0.000602) (0.000885) 
          
Observations 50,171 50,222 63,337 34,520 
R-squared 0.020 0.019 0.002 0.018 
39 
 
     
Industry & year fixed-effects yes no yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
 
Table 7 shows results of estimating the average association between increasing (decreasing) RepRisk Index from year 
t to year t+1 and differences in the effective tax rate over the same period (columns 1-3). RepRiskIndex_increase is 
the difference of the RRI from year t to t+1 for increasing values and 0 otherwise. RepRiskIndex_decrease is the 
difference of the RRI from year t to t+1for decreasing values and 0 otherwise. Results in column 4 are based on an 
estimation in a 5-year window from t+2 to t-2 and 1-year lagged independent variables. See Appendix A for the 
variable definition. For an easier interpretation, RepRisk Index is normalized between 0 and 1. See Appendix A for 
















































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Incorporated 











VARIABLES ETR ETR ETR ETR ETR ETR 
              
RepRiskIndex_increase -0.00292 0.0213** 0.0266** 0.00707 0.0213 0.0226 
  (0.0405) (0.0108) (0.0128) (0.0181) (0.0142) (0.0155) 
RepRiskIndex_decrease 0.0390 0.0439*** 0.0468*** 0.0353 0.0381* 0.0477** 
  (0.0573) (0.0149) (0.0175) (0.0262) (0.0203) (0.0212) 
ΔSize 0.0173 -0.0132*** -0.0135** -0.0100* -0.0143*** -0.0101 
  (0.0244) (0.00388) (0.00535) (0.00536) (0.00421) (0.00883) 
ΔLeverage 0.0115 0.00877 0.0174 -0.000456 0.0101 0.00715 
  (0.0350) (0.00946) (0.0126) (0.0133) (0.0118) (0.0145) 
ΔIntangibles 0.0244 0.0161 0.0148 0.0234 0.0198* 0.0102 
  (0.0447) (0.0101) (0.0126) (0.0156) (0.0116) (0.0170) 
ΔR&D 1.029 0.0612 0.189 -0.105 0.0358 0.255 
  (0.917) (0.0911) (0.117) (0.144) (0.0890) (0.183) 
ΔInventory Intensity 0.0609 0.0914*** 0.108*** 0.0767*** 0.0490*** 0.156*** 
  (0.0536) (0.0161) (0.0218) (0.0205) (0.0170) (0.0330) 
ΔCapital Intensity 0.0168 0.0319*** 0.0177 0.0440*** 0.0406*** 0.0107 
  (0.0663) (0.00955) (0.0142) (0.0131) (0.0106) (0.0190) 
ΔCapex 0.0986 0.0331* 0.0365 0.0366 0.0187 0.0455 
  (0.0856) (0.0182) (0.0254) (0.0239) (0.0199) (0.0377) 
ΔRoa -0.435*** -0.305*** -0.343*** -0.279*** -0.236*** -0.411*** 
  (0.0706) (0.0176) (0.0241) (0.0223) (0.0188) (0.0312) 
ΔStatutory Rate -0.238* 0.493*** 0.497*** 0.263** 0.384*** 0.538*** 
  (0.143) (0.0593) (0.0629) (0.126) (0.0951) (0.0717) 
Constant 0.00504 0.00455*** 0.00347*** 0.00581*** 0.00704*** 0.00240* 
  (0.00394) (0.000846) (0.00109) (0.00132) (0.00106) (0.00134) 
              
Observations 2,665 47,506 31,375 18,796 24,249 25,025 
R-squared 0.051 0.019 0.022 0.018 0.015 0.026 
Industry & year fixed-effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
Table 8 shows results of estimating the average association between increasing (decreasing) RepRisk Index from year 
t to year t+1 and differences in the effective tax rate over the same period. RepRiskIndex_increase is the difference of 
the RRI from year t to t+1 for increasing values and 0 otherwise. RepRiskIndex_decrease is the difference of the RRI 
from year t to t+1 for decreasing values and 0 otherwise. Results in columns 1 and 2 show DiD estimations for firms 
that are incorporated in a tax haven (1) and non-haven (2) separately. Columns 3 and 4 show DiD estimations for the 
years 2013-2019 (post-BEPS) and 2007-2012 (pre-BEPS) separately. Columns 5 and 6 show DiD estimations for 
firms with high political risk (5) and low political risk (6). For an easier interpretation, RepRisk Index is normalized 







Variable Definition (Compustat item) 
ETR Tax expense (txt) divided by current year’s pre-tax income (pi) 
RepRisk Index RepRisk Index ranging from 0 to 100 
RepRiskIndex_increase 
 




The difference of the RRI from year t to t+1 for decreasing values and 0 
otherwise 
Size  Natural logarithm of total assets (at) 
Leverage Long‐term debt (dltt), scaled by lagged total assets (at) 
Intangibles  Intangible assets (intan), scaled by lagged total assets (at) 
Inventory Intensity Inventory (invt), scaled by lagged total assets (at) 
R&D Research and development expense (xrd), scaled by lagged total assets (at) 
Capital Intensity 
 
Net property, plant, and equipment (ppent), scaled by lagged total assets 
(at) 
Capex Capital expenditures (capx), scaled by lagged assets (at) 
Return on Assets Pretax income (pi), scaled by lagged total assets (at) 

















This issue refers to the torture, mistreatment or abuse of animals, through experiments, 
husbandry, trophy hunting, etc. 
Climate change, GHG 
emissions, and global 
pollution 
This issue includes pollution, mainly atmospheric, that has negative impacts beyond the 
surroundings in which the emissions occur. This includes, for example, criticism related 
to climate change, carbon, and other greenhouse gas emissions, coal-fired power plants, 





This issue covers impacts of company activities on ecosystems or landscapes such as 
forests, rivers, seas, etc., contamination of groundwater and water systems, deforestation, 
impacts on wildlife, etc. 
Local pollution This issue covers pollution into air, water, and soil that has a primarily local effect, 
including oil spills, etc. 
Overuse and wasting 
of resources This issue refers to a company’s overuse, inefficient use of waste of renewable and 
nonrenewable resources, such as energy, water, commodities, etc. 
Waste issues 
This issue relates to inappropriate disposal or handling of waste from the company’s 
production processes or projects, as well as waste trafficking. 
Social Issues 
Child labor 
This issue refers to the use of child labor by an employer, according to the ILO 
Conventions. This includes, for example, child prostitution, child pornography, child 
trafficking, etc. for those under 18 years old. 
Discrimination in 
employment 
This issue refers to treating people differently or less favorably because of characteristics 
that are not related to their merit or the inherent requirements of the job, such as gender, 
religion, nationality, age, etc. Discrimination can arise either when gaining access to 
employment or once employees are in work 
Forced labor This issue refers to the use of forced or compulsory labor by an employer. This includes, 
for example, bonded labor, prison labor, exploitative practices, full or partial 
restrictions on freedom of movement, withholding of wages, threats of deportation for 




This issue refers to violations of workers’ rights to organize and collectively bargain. 
This includes, for example, interfering with union formation and participation, retaliation 
against striking workers, refusal to comply with union agreements, etc. 
Human rights abuses, 
corporate complicity 
This issue is linked when a company is accused of committing or being complicit in 
human rights abuses. This includes, for example, violence against individuals, threat of 
violence, child and forced labor, human trafficking, organ trafficking, privatization of 





This issue relates to activities of a company that leads to problems or worries for a 
community, such as a village or town or a group of people with common interests, 
values, preferences, social background, etc. This includes, for example, land- and water-
grabbing, negative impacts on a community’s livelihood/employment opportunities, 
relocation of communities, safety impacts, access to lifesaving drugs, etc. 
Local participation 
issues 
This issue covers instances in which local communities or individuals are not 
appropriately consulted about the activities of a company, do not benefit appropriately 
from their activities, or when companies use unethical tactics, such as imprisonment or 
harassment, to silence their critics. 
Occupational health 
and safety issues 
This issue refers to health and safety matters in the context of employee relations within 
a company. This includes, for example, lack of safety for employees at work, 
occupational accidents 
related to poor health and safety measures, sickness among workers related to production 
processes, negligence resulting in work-related accidents, etc. 
Poor employment 
conditions 
This issue refers to poor employment conditions. This includes, for example, “slave-
like” working conditions, “sweatshop” labor, harrasment and mistreatment of employees 
(including sexual), issues related to labor contracts and/or pay, illegal employment, 
unfair dismissals, spying on employees, etc. 
Social discrimination 
This issue refers to treating people differently or less favorably because of certain 
characteristics, such as gender, racial, ethnic, or religious, outside of an employment 
setting (such as customers). See “Discrimination in employments” for discriminatory 




This issue refers to business or government practices that prevent, reduce or manipulate 
competition in a market. This includes, for example, bid-rigging, dumping, exclusive 
dealing, price fixing, 
dividing territories, government-granted monopolies, limit pricing, tying, resale price 




This issue refers to corruption, bribery, extortion and money laundering. The 
understanding of corruption is based on the 10th Principle of the UN Global Compact. 
This includes, for example, use of slush funds, aggressive lobbying, overcharging, 
nepotism, cronyism, connections to organized crime, etc. 
Executive 
compensation issues 
This issue refers to the compensation (salary, bonus and other remuneration) of top 
management, regardless of their performance. This includes, for example, excessive 
bonuses, salaries, pensions, termination settlements, benefits, etc. 
Fraud 
This issue refers to intentional deception made for personal gain or damage to another 
individual (lying with financial or legal impacts). This includes, for example, 
counterfeiting, forgery, embezzlement, insider trading, fraud related to bankruptcy, 
investments or securities, breach of fiduciary duty, false 






This issue refers to when a company manipulates the truth in an effort to present itself in 
a positive light, and in the meantime contradicts this self-created image through its 
actions. Also refers to when a company misleads consumers about its products and 
services. This includes, for example, “greenwashing,” false advertising, off-label 
marketing, “astroturfing,” etc. 
Tax evasion 
This issue refers to general efforts to not pay taxes by illegal means. This includes, for 
example, tax fraud, use of tax havens, etc. 
Tax optimization 
This issue refers to the practice of minimizing tax liability through tax planning. While 
not illegal, it may be associated with abuse of the law. Often criticized for robbing a 
state of potential tax revenues, particularly in developing countries. This includes, for 
example, tax inversion, the relocation of a company’s headquarters to a low-tax country 
while retaining operations in a high-tax country, and tax avoidance, taking advantage of 
benificial tax “loopholes.” 
 
